The central and local governments' incentives to invest in public infrastructure and compete for subsidies are determined by the trade-off between political benefits and economic costs, the latter depending on the extent of decentralization of fiscal authority. However, there has been a lack of attention to the role of labor mobility across jurisdictions, known to be particularly important when governments (center and local) cannot impose strict control on inter-regional migration. To analyze how the local governments determine their investment strategies to maximize the sum of welfare in the region in response to the possible policy regimes: fiscal centralization, complete decentralization and partial decentralization, I endogenize the relationship between the production labor inputs and public infrastructure provided by the central and local governments. I show that a simple model with labor mobility across regions suggests that complete fiscal decentralization and partial fiscal decentralization are not necessarily the best in terms of economic efficiency in the sense at least one local government or both local governments invest more in public infrastructure than under complete fiscal centralization. This implies that the central government is still needed to get involved in the entire process of decision making in public infrastructure provision.
INTRODUCTION
National and regional economic performance depends heavily on public infrastructure such as highways, airports and seaports. Generally, such publicly funded infrastructure is supposed to streamline regional economic activities.
Even under the current tight fiscal conditions, the Japanese government is criticized for not providing for the public infrastructure efficiently enough 1) . There is much controversy regarding how both the central and local governments can respond to the expectations, especially regarding role allocation between the central government and the local governments. Some lawmakers claim that decentralization must be promoted for efficient infrastructure development 2) . It is generally thought that a decentralized infrastructure management has several advantages over the centralized one: the local government is betterinformed about the needs of the local communities and relevant socio-economic conditions. Centralized infrastructure management, however, is still essential for avoiding worthless and overlap-ping investments.
Previous studies have suggested that the governments' incentives to invest and compete for subsidies are determined by the trade-off between political benefits and economic costs, the latter depending on the extent of decentralization of fiscal authority. For example, Qian and Roland 3) analyzed the link between fiscal competition and government incentives for bailouts in the context of the organization of government, and showed that fiscal competition among local governments increases the opportunity costs of bailout under factor mobility. Wildasin 4) analyzed the extent to which the local expenditures are affected by a bailout policy of the central government where positive externalities associated with provision of public goods exist. He examined the conditions under which the central government does or does not intervene in local expenditures. These relevant studies have assumed that the total population size of regions is fixed and remains constant.
Other than these studies, a number of economic research regarding how socially optimal public goods provision is performed in the presence of free labor and/or capital mobility have done. A word "public goods" has several different meanings in different contexts. In one meaning, (Type I) "public goods" provided by governments directly enhances the welfare of the residents. In the other meaning, (Type II) provision of public goods enhances the productivity of the regions, as an input into the production process, which does not directly but indirectly enhance the welfare of the economy. It is also important whether public goods have spillover effect or not.
In line with the issues mentioned above, I here review several important studies to highlight the originality of this study.
As already mentioned above, we have two ways of interpretations of public goods provision, namely Type I and II. First, I here review related studies where "public goods" are treated as type I goods. Warr 5) showed that income redistribution by the government no longer affects the total size of provided public goods where each individuals voluntarily bared expense for the goods. This result is famous as "neutrality theorem". Though this study dealt with the economy comprising one government and N-residents, it can be extended to analyze the case where the economy comprises one central government and N-local governments. In this study, public goods is seen as no-excludable "pure" public goods which have spillover effect, and the residents are assumed as homogeneous ones.
Boadway and Flatters 6) examined the case where the economy comprises one central government and two local governments. They assumed labor is freely-mobile and the only input into the production process characterized by decreasing returns to labor. Under such assumptions, They showed that decentralized control leads to socially inefficient results even if households are homogeneous. Wildasin 7) , 8) examined whether two symmetric governments should use either tax rates or government expenditure as fiscal instrument. This is called "tax-competition" problem. This study dealt with public goods which have spillover effects. He concluded that tax rates and government expenditure strategically determined by using "tax rates" as fiscal instrument is higher than those determined by using "government expenditure". Myers 9) examined, in line with the discussion made by Boadway-Flatter, the case where labor is freely-mobile and provided public goods have no spillover effect. He reached a remarkable re-sult: Nash equilibrium as outcome of the game by the local governments is Pareto optimal, and this suggests there is no role of the higher hierarchy of the government (i.e. the central government).
Boadway et al. 10) analyzed provision of pure public goods in the two ways in which the government introduces lump-sum income redistribution or matching grants as financial sources. It is assumed that provided public goods have spillover effects. They showed that higher matching grants leads to increasing public goods provision, and the total amount of provided public goods may be neutralized by the degree of the government's redistribution policy.
Wellish 11),12) analyzed the both cases where the residents are perfectly and imperfectly free mobile. The public goods have spillover effects. He showed that Nash equilibrium, as an outcome of the local governments' competition, is socially efficient and there is no need for Pigovian tax levied by the higher hierarchy of the government in the both cases.
Myers 13) analyzed the case where there is tax evasion or inefficiency in government expenditure. He concluded that in such case it may be better that public goods are voluntarily provided by individuals/households under the initiative of the facilitator rather than that all public goods are provided by the government.
Caplan et al. 14) and Caplan and Silva 15) analyzed the case labor is imperfectly mobile. The former dealt with pure public goods and the latter dealt with impure ones, both of which are spillover effects. They concluded that in the both cases efficient provision could be possible under decentralized leadership by using a proper income redistribution policy.
Akai and Ihori 16) analyzed the impact on welfare where public goods have spillover effects and provision of such public goods is stimulated by matching grants subsidized by the central government under fiscal decentralization regime. They assumed there are two types of public goods, one of which is provided by the local governments with grants subsidized by the central government (they called "local public goods") and the other of which is provided directly by the central government (they called "central public goods"). They showed that welfare impact by the changes in the matching grants depends on substitution and evaluation effects between on the local public goods and the central public goods.
Secondly, I here review related studies where "public goods" is treated as type II goods, which enhance the productivity of the regions.
Zodrow and Mieszkowski 17) compared the im-pacts on welfare where the expenses for public goods are covered either by the neutral head taxes or distorting taxes on capital. They assumed that free capital mobility while labor and land is fixed on the regions, there are N-homogeneous local governments and no central government, and the public goods have no spillover effects. They showed that the total amount of taxes and government expenditure for the public goods provision which is covered solely by the head taxes is larger than that which is covered solely by the distorting taxes levied on capital. They also showed that, however, the impact on the total amount of taxes and government expenditure caused by the changes in the amount of head taxes depends on production technology in the case the governments introduced the head taxes and distorting taxes together. Bayindir-Upmann 18) analyzed public good provision of type II in line with the similar analytical framework developed by Wildasin 7), 8) . He showed that the same result obtained by Wildasin 7) , 8) does not always hold for public good provision of type II.
Fenge and Meier 19) analyzed the policy to restrain undesired immigration generating unemployment in a federation like EU. He compared the impact on welfare under the two policy regimes, one of which is providing infrastructure as a mean of enhancing the productivity of the poor regions, and the other of which is using grants for wage compensation.
Here, we have a number of policy implications from these previous studies in order to answer a question how the governments' incentives to provide public infrastructure are affected by the fiscal contacts between the central and local governments in the presence of free labor mobility. However, from view points of infrastructure planning and management considering provision of roads, ports and airports, we should proceed with further analysis incorporating the following the three issues.
First, we need consider the asymmetry of the regions under general analytical frameworks. Several studies mentioned above dealt only with the case of homogeneous regions. Since geographical conditions vary greatly among different regions in Japan, the effects on welfare by the same amount of public infrastructure provision should be assumed to vary in different regions.
Second, we need take into consideration the features of public infrastructure. As already mentioned above, we have the two types of interpretations of "public goods", namely Type I and Type II. It is rather appropriate to treat pub-lic infrastructure as Type II public goods since roads, airports and ports work as an input into the production process and enhance the productivity of the economy. Therefore we need proceed with analysis in line not with studies including Warr 5) and Myers 9) but with previous studies including Zodrow and Mieszkowski 17) and Bayindir-Upmann 18) .
Third, we need take into consideration the political culture identical to Japan. In the context of Japanese public infrastructure provision, the central government has played a key role in such public infrastructure provision by preparing the "comprehensive national development plan" and budgets for the projects. The role of the local governments has been limited in that the local governments expenses a certain percentage of the total expenses for the infrastructure projects planned and lead by the central government. There are little number of studies which deal with fiscal interaction between the central government and local governments suited to the Japanese situation. In particular, the case where the subsidies reallocated from the central government to the local governments are endogeneously determined by the local governments' decisions on public infrastructure provision and the subsidies are in proportion to the size of public infrastructure investment, which do not take the form of a lump-sum transfer. This paper departs from previous work in this respect. This study deals with the assymmetricity of the structure of local governments, the situation where all public infrastructure investment go to business as an input into the production process and the political culture identical to Japan where the subsidies reallocated from the central government to the local governments are endogeneously determined by the local governments' decisions. No other previous studies have dealt with above all things. I endogenize the relationship between the size of the population of the regions, in addition to public infrastructure provided by the governments to analyze how local governments determine their investment strategies to maximize the sum of welfare in the region in response to the policy regimes: fiscal centralization, complete decentralization and partial decentralization. With labor mobility, this paper shows that at least one local government or both local governments tend to invest more in public infrastructure under both the complete decentralization regime and the partial decentralization regime than under centralization regime.
Under the assumptions that labor is perfect mobile across the regions within a country and im-mobile across countries and there is no bail-out policy, I find that complete fiscal decentralization and partial fiscal decentralization are not necessarily the best in terms of economic efficiency in the sense at least one local government or both local governments invest more in public infrastructure than under complete fiscal centralization. Numerical simulation results suggest that careful parameterization of the economy is very important to determine whether decentralization leads to a "race to the bottom". In context of public infrastructure management, a "race to the bottom" means that the competition of the two local governments would lead to undermine social welfare of regions and the whole country by overinvestment in public infrastructure, and may result in an investment equilibrium far away from the first best state. These imply that competition between governments is not necessarily allaround good thing and that the involvement of the central government is still needed throughout the entire process of decision making in public infrastructure provision.
THE BASIC MODEL
Consider a three-tiered transition economy consisting of: (i) a central government, that allocates central government budget of the purpose of regional redistribution and the provision of a national public good; (ii) two local governments, each endowed with the autonomy to perform the tasks of tax collection towards the provision of a local public good such as education, social welfare and so on, and the provision of a local public infrastructure such as highways, seaports and airports; (iii) private enterprises and households. Private enterprises serve the dual role of providing employment opportunities to private households and tax revenues to central and local governments.
In what follows, I lay out the specifics of the decision problem of the agents in three-tiers of transition economy, and examine how the central government's planning problem trickles down to affect the total public infrastructure investment.
(1) Production function
Private enterprises located in region i carry out production activities in a competitive environment, taking as input of production household labor inputs, L i with (an endogenously determined) real wage w i . The regions produce a numeraire output according to a quadratic aggregate production function (g(
is twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave with respect to L i . To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that one unit of output can be transformed into one unit of the public infrastructure and public goods, so that scale effects are ignored. I i denotes the public infrastructure that makes private enterprises more productive. I i is financed by the central government or local government, which is interpreted as a stock variable. This setting implies that public infrastructure has no spillover effects. g( ) is also concave function, which provides the degree to which public infrastructure investment enhances the productivity of the regions. The rationale for the use of a quadratic production function is given as follows. This type of production function is used in models with labor economics (i.e. Deolaliker and Vijverberg 20) ).
A quadratic function form works as second order approximation of other more general functions in that the first order derivatives with respect to input is positive and the second order is negative (a strictly increasing and concave function). This equation measures download slope of the average product and marginal product curves with diminishing returns. With a quadratic production function, a region's demand curve for labor is linearly diminishing and would be shifted upward under the condition where public infrastructure investment is conducted. This is economic interpretation of the quadratic production function.
Finally, a i denotes endowed locational constant representing other factors that makes enterprises more or less productive such as geography and the like. Since geographical conditions vary greatly among different regions in Japan, the effects on welfare by the same amount of public infrastructure provision should be assumed to vary. By introducing a region specific parameter, a i , we can consider the asymmetry of the regions in the analytical framework. Furthermore, b denotes constant regarding production household labor inputs which is common to all the regions.
The profit maximization problem of the representative private enterprise is given by:
where π is maximized profit of the enterprise in region-i and T i is tax imposed by a local government as lump sum. Note that π i is not zero without any loss of generality because I assume only the two aggregated producers in the economy. The first order condition associated with the I_90 profit maximization problem (1) is given by
To simplify discussion in following sections, through out the paper I will define g(I i ) as:
where g(I i ) is continuously differentiable and strictly concave, and thus 0 ≤ δ < 1. Since we have g(0) = 1, we have always positive output regardless the value of I i .
(2) Labor mobility I assume that local residents can move freely between the two regions to take advantage of better job opportunities and higher wages without any cost of relocation. I assume perfect labor mobility and thus, local residents belonging to the region j, if w i > w j , would move their residential places from region-j to region-i, and vice versa. Hence, migration of labor would finally stop and wage ratio would be equalized between the two regions. This assumption implies that local residents would choose their location taking into consideration only the amount of the wage, w i . The amount of local public goods other than public infrastructure, i.e., education, social security and the like, is assumed to be excluded from the consideration. The rationale for this assumption is that the amount of such local public goods to be provided is strictly regulated by national standards, and such amount is considered to be little different from that of other regions. This assumption is suited to the current Japanese situation.
Furthermore, take note that all the population must be employed in labor market of the country, and the labor market must be cleared.
In labor market of the country, we must have:
From (3), (4) and (5), we have:
Since we must have L i > 0 ∀ i, we must have also
(3) Social welfare function The objective of each local government is to maximize the sum of the welfare of the third-tier participants. To do so, the two local governments independently choose I i and I j taking the other government's choice as given.
The social welfare of the region-i is given as follows:
with first order condition:
where a i is region-specific parameter (given). Social welfare is interpreted as the total amount of remains of output which would not go to public infrastructure investment as an input into the production process. P i denotes the amount of local public goods other than public infrastructure, i.e., education, social security and the like. I assume P i has no spillovers across jurisdictions. Since real w is common to the two regions, the welfare of households depends on local public good P i as well as sum of laborers' incomes wL i and enterprises' profit π i . In addition, we must have P i = T i − I i due to the local governments' budget constraint when there is neither lump sum tax paid to the central government nor subsidies distributed by the central government 1 . From the equation (3) and (6), the equation (9) is equivalent to:
and from (3), equation (10) can be rearranged as follows by dividing g ′ (I i )a i :
whereĨ i = 1 + I i . It can be verified from equation (10) that an optimal investment I i increases as a i increases for small enough δ. This is because both
It can be also verified that I i decreases as a j increases if δ < 1 2 for the same reason. In other words, as region specific factor a i increasesi.e., improves education, public investment in the same region also increases while the other region's investment decreases.
In addition, it should be noted that an optimal investment I i for the social welfare maximization problem is given by function of I j and vice versa. Thus, optimal public investment is determined through behaviors of the two local governments in public investment.
Allowed to provide public infrastructure directly by using lump sum tax paid by local governments, the central government chooses the amount of investment, I i , so that the sum of the nation's social welfare, ∑ i W i , can be maximized.
(4) Other assumptions
In order to acquire a unique solution for the social welfare maximization problem (8), following two assumptions must be satisfied.
a) Elimination of corner solution
Every region has public infrastructure I i > 0 for production activities. In order to eliminate corner solution (I i =0), we must have:
Social welfare function of the region (8) must be concave with respect to both I i and I j . Second order condition is
Later, I will discuss the sum of the nation's social welfare ∑ i W i . I will assume the central government maximizes ∑ i W i by choosing both I i and I j simultaneously under centralization regime. In order to have a unique solution (I i , I j ), I also assume:
These two assumptions imply that b andL must be large enough.
THE CENTRALIZATION CASE
I begin by analyzing the centralization case as a benchmark. The centralization means that the central government makes all decisions regarding public infrastructure investment and the local governments have no way to modify the investment plan decided by the central government.
(1) Social welfare function
The objective of the central government, taking as given the region-specific parameter a i and the region-common parameter b, is to maximize the sum of the welfare of the whole country. To simplify the discussion, the local governments surrender τ i as lump sum tax to the central government, and provide local public goods P i other than public infrastructure by using remaining T i − τ i . The central government allocates its revenue to local public infrastructure I i within its budget.
The social welfare maximization problem of the central government is described as follows.
where w denotes the equalized wage given the equation (4) and (5), which means that the equation (6) holds. The social welfare maximization problem given the equation (15) is modified as:
The first order conditions associated with the social welfare maximization problem (16) is given by
Since W G (I i , I j ) is concave function in both I i and I j , the second order condition is satisfied. Furthermore, since L i is a function of the two decision variable I i and I j from the equation (6), the implicit solutions to the first order conditions (17) give the optimal public infrastructure investment I i and I j . Equation (17) provides the following two implications: (i) a solution to (17) denoting I C i , increases as region-specific parameter a i increases; (ii) I C i decreases as the other region's parameter a j increases; and (iii) I C i is less than I D i denoting the solution to equation (9), the last one being implied by the fact that
THE COMPLETE DECENTRAL-IZATION CASE
Consider the complete decentralization case where the local governments hold absolute powers in determining all public infrastructure investment policies. Under the complete decentralization regime, the local governments provide their public infrastructure by their own funds and the central government no longer intervene with them.
(1) Investment equilibrium under the complete decentralization regime Given equation (10), we have already obtained necessary conditions for determining an optimal investment. By concavity of W i (I i , I j ), the equation is supposed to be necessary and sufficient conditions for the social welfare maximization problem.
A unique investment equilibrium between the two local governments is determined by Nash Equilibrium of the two local governments' investment behaviors. This is given by the intersection of two curves in Fig.1 .
In the context of the two local governments model, I * 1 and I * 2 simultaneously solve
(18) Hence, we can obtain a unique investment equilibrium between the two local governments,(I * 1 , I * 2 ), as a intersection of the two best response curves.
(2) Estimation of total investment under the complete decentralization I now examine the extent to which local public infrastructure is provided under the complete decentralization regime. To see this, I compare the investment equilibria of the complete decentralization and the centralization case.
Let I D * i denote the optimal public infrastructure investment for the region-i government under the decentralization regime. Also, let I C * i denotes the optimal public infrastructure investment for the region-i government under the centralization regime.
Let Ψ i (I i ) denote the left-hand side of the equation (9) . Hence,
and Ψ i (I i ) = 1 gives the optimal I * i , given an opponent's strategy I j .
Now I summarize this observation in the following lemma and give a proof:
Under complete decentralized public infrastructure provision regime, a rich region (with larger a i ) invests more in public infrastructure than a poor region (with smaller a i ) does.
Proof
Without loss of generality, suppose a 1 ≥ a 2 and a 1 = a 2 + a ′ with a ′ ≥ 0. First of all, I consider the case with a ′ = 0. Then, we must have I * 1 = I * 2 by symmetric property of the problem. Now I suppose that a ′ > 0. Ψ 1 (I 1 , I 2 ; a ′ ) = 1 and Ψ 2 (I 1 , I 2 ; a ′ ) = 1 give an equilibria, (I * 1 , I * 2 ) under complete decentralized public infrastructure provision regime. Totally differentiating Ψ i (I 1 , I 2 ; a ′ ) ∀i, then we have:
This is because if ∆ < 0, then I would not find any equilibria which satisfies Ψ i (I * 1 , I * 2 ) = 1 ∀i as figured in Fig.2 .
In order to analyze how an investment equilibria (I * 1 , I * 2 ) changes according to changes in the value of a ′ , signs of
Also, by simple calculation, I have ∂Ψ 1 ∂a ′ > 0 and On the other hand, the investment equilibria under the centralization regime is determined by the first order necessary and sufficient condition (17) . Let Φ i (I i ) denotes the left-hand side of the equation (17) . Hence,
and Φ i (I i ) = 1 gives the optimal I * i , given an opponent's strategy I j .
Since
> 0 holds from the two equations, (4) and (6),
must always hold given a same opponent's strategy I j .
Let 
Proposition 1 . Under complete decentralized public infrastructure provision regime;
[I] if the two regions are homogeneous, that is, a 1 = a 2 , then both regions invests more in public infrastructure (I i ) than under fiscal centralization regime.
[II] if the two regions are heterogeneous, that is, a 1 > a 2 , then at least one region or both regions invest more in public infrastructure than under fiscal centralization regime. Evaluated at the investment equilibrium under the complete decentralization regime, we must have:
Proof
At the investment equilibrium under the centralization regime, we must have
Since g(I i ) is concave, we obtain:
Since the total population of the country is constant, equation (26) yields:
Equation (27) The proof is the same as part (i) of the homogeneous case and thus, this condition cannot hold. Fig.3 illustrates the assignment of public infrastructure provided in the both regions under complete fiscal centralization regime and complete fiscal decentralization. ψ i (I j ) and ϕ i (I j ) denote the best-response correspondence curves which give the optimal investment strategy of the region-i local government under fiscal decentralization and fiscal centralization, respectively. Higher best-response correspondences are achieved through the condition (g(I i )a i − bL i ) ∂L I ∂I i > 0 under the complete decentralization regime, implying, as should be expected, increases in public infrastructure in at least one region or both regions.
If the two regions are heterogeneous, then we still have the following three possibilities: 
(3) Numerical simulation
In order to see how the model works, I first see what determines the investment equilibria under the complete decentralization regime with the best-response correspondence curves and the indifference curves of the two local governments, and the Pareto optimal allocation under the centralization regime. Our main tool for exposition of the properties of the model is numerical simulation. In the case of two local governments model, it is possible to represent the determination of the investment in terms of a two dimension diagram. The premise conditions are given in the Table 1 .
One such diagram is illustrated in Fig.4 . On the axes of this figure are the amount of public infrastructure investment I 1 and I 2 in the region-1 government and the region-2 government, respectively. The two bold solid lines indicate the best-response correspondence curves: the green one indicates ψ 1 (I 2 ) and the red one indicates ψ 2 (I 1 ), respectively. The intersection of these two curves gives an investment equilibrium under the complete decentralization regime and satisfies I D * 1 = ψ 1 (I D * 2 ) and I D * 2 = ψ 2 (I D * 1 ) simultaneously. The two narrow solid lines indicate the indifference curves with the same social welfare of the two governments.
On the other hand, the large red dot indicates the pareto optimal allocation (I C * 1 , I C * 2 ) under the centralization regime. It can be readily verified from Fig.4 that the Pareto optimal allocaition locates inside the two best-correspondence curves, that is, I D * i > I C * i ∀i. The bold broken line indicates the indifference curve with the same social welfare of the country as a whole.
In the case illustrated in Fig.4 , the investment equilibrium is symmetric with each economy having an identical region-specific parameter, and providing the identical public infrastruc-ture, respectively. As a result of numerical analysis, public infrastructure provision of the two local governments under the complete decentralization regime, is about 1.4 times as much as under the centralization regime, as Proposition 1 suggests.
The other calculated results, both for the centralization regime and the complete decentralization regime, are also given in Table 1 . The real wage under the centralization regime, w c * , is smaller than that under the complete decentralization regime, w D * . The sum of the welfare of the whole country under the centralization regime, ∑ i W C * i , is higher than that under the complete decentralization regime,
i , which means that the welfare of the whole country under the complete decentralization is worse off than that under the centralization regime.
The change in the region-specific parameter a i affects the investment equilibrium under complete decentralization regime. To see this, Fig.5 is constructed with a higher level of the regionspecific parameter. All other parameters remain the same as Fig.4 .
Comparing the best-response correspondence curves in Fig.5 with the curves in Fig.4 . The best-response correspondence curve of the region-2 ψ 2 (I 1 ) shifts to the lower position while the curve ψ 1 (I 2 ) shifts to the right, as Lemma 1 suggests. As a result, the investment equilibrium given by the intersection of the two curves shifts to the lower right.
On the other hand, Fig.6 is constructed with a higher level of the region-specific parameter of region 2 than the case 2. The best-response correspondence curve for the region-2 ψ 2 (I 1 ) shifts to the upper position and the curve for the region-1 ψ 1 (I 2 ) shifts back to the left, as Lemma 1 suggests. Consequently, the investment equilibrium given by the intersection of the two curves shifts to the higher left compared with Case 2. In Case 3, public investment made by both the regions is more than case 1, as already discussed.
Case 4 provided the simulation result when the parameter b was slightly increased compared with Case 2. As the parameter b increases, the social welfare function is more concave. Intuitively, as the social welfare function is more concave, public investment is likely to decrease. This implies that both the region-specific parameter a 1 and the parameter regarding the marginal labor productivity b are important for investment equilibrium analysis.
These four numerical simulations suggested that slight difference in parameters would lead a significant different result. This implies that careful parameterization of the economy is very important to evaluate the level of public investment under a certain fiscal contract between the central and local governments. Also, a simple model with perfect labor mobility across regions suggests that complete fiscal decentralization is not necessarily the best in terms of economic efficiency in the sense at least one local government or both local governments invest more in public infrastructure than under complete fiscal centralization.
THE PARTIAL DECENTRALIZA-TION CASE AS A POSSIBLE SO-LUTION
Up to this point, we have already seen the two extreme case: the centralization case and the complete decentralization case. As an intermediate case, I consider partial decentralization case in this section. Partial decentralization case means that both the central government and the local government are responsible for public infrastructure provision in accordance with an appropriate rule stipulating the role allocation between the two governments.
One possible rule is that the central government is responsible for providing public infrastructure at certain level and the local government provides additional public infrastructure taking into consideration of its own socio-economic situation, and strategy for economic development and budget. Public infrastructure provided directed by the central government is supposed to be determined by the social welfare of the country as a whole.Contrary to the central government, the local governments maximize the social welfare of the region, not the country as a whole. Consequently, the local government are competing in providing public infrastructure each other, and tend to overinvest. In this section, I show this tendency and the equivalency between the complete decentralization case mentioned in Section 4 and the partial decentralization case in this sense.
In this section, it is shown that the neutrality theorem, first discovered by Warr 5) holds true in this partial decentralization case. In other words, it is shown that the partial decentralization where the central government and the local governments decide each public infrastructure investment independently but the former decides ex-ante and the latters decide ex-post is equivalent to the complete decentralization in terms of economic efficiency. While the partial decentralization case holds true of the neutrality theorem, some differences between this study and the previous studies are explained as follows: this study deals with the public infrastructure investment which has no spillovers across jurisdictions; the assymmetricity of the structure of local governments; and the situation where all public infrastructure investment goes to business as an input into the production process, while no other previous studies have dealt with above all things.
Another possibility is that the local governments decide their public infrastructure investment by themselves, and the central government provide subsidies to the local governments. This subsidy is supposed to be proportional to the size of public investment made by each local government. This case is referred as "The Decentralization Case with Subsidies From the Central Government" and further discussed in the next section.
(1) Investment equilibrium under partial decentralization case I describe the partial decentralization case as a simple extention of the basic model.
Under the partial decentralization regime, the decision problems of the three stakeholders are determined by the following three steps.
At the beginning of the stage, the central government determines a national infrastructure development plan. The central government cannot obtain relevant information regarding the respective local governments' public infrastructure plan. I also assume that the central government determines ex-post not taking into consideration the responses of the local governments to the decision by the central government, which implies that the interaction between the central government and the local governments is not depicted as the game between the central and local governments.
At the second stage, the local governments determines its own public infrastructure investment taking into consideration not only of the opponent investment strategy but also of the central government's public infrastructure plan, G i and G j . I assume the local governments can obtain relevant information regarding public infrastructure provided directly by the central government.
At the last stage, the private enterprises determines its own production activities.
The social welfare maximization problem of the central government, the equation (15) with the first order condition (17) , is modified as follows:
Since the central government cannot obtain the local governments' decision the decision problem (28) is equivalent to the problem represented by the equations (15) and (17) . Hence, we must have G P D * i = G C * i for all i. The decision problem for the local governments, the equation (8) is modified by as follows:
(29) To analyze the local government's decision problem, let X i denote the total public investment provided in the region i. Thus, we have X i = I i + G i . Here, I suppose I i > 0 since local governments cannot "remove" parts of the central government's investment.
The decision problem (29) is rearranged as:
where G P D * i and τ P D * i are optima determined by the central government's decision problem (28).
Given these parameters, local governments establish their own investment policy to maximize the sum of region welfare just as under the complete decentralization case. By differentiating (28) we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for solution to the problem. That is, X P D *
The equations (31) are equivalent to the first order necessary and sufficient conditions (18) , respectively. We have, thus, arrived at the following result: 
DECENTRALIZATION WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERN-MENT'S SUBSIDIES
In this section, I analyze another possible fiscal decentralization regime where the local governments primarily determine their public investment taking into account of the other local government decision and the subsidy from the central government in order to maximize the sum of the region welfare. I assume that the subsidies reallocated from the central government to the local governments are endogeneously determined by the local govenments' decision on public infrastructure provision.
(1) Investment equilibrium under decentralization with central government subsidies Just as the partial decentralization case, I describe the decentralization with the central government's subsidy as a simple extension of the basic model. The size of subsidies is determined based on the actual expenditure of the local governments for public infrastructure: it is proportionally redistributed among local governments. The local governments are not prohibited to use the subsidy for other purpose. That is, the subsidy from the central government is supposed to be used for providing both public infrastructure and public good such as welfare, education and so on. This type of subsidy is very similar to the local redistribution tax, which is transferred from the central government to local governments based on the size of region, population and expenditure in public investment and public good. Actually, local redistribution tax is one of the most important financial sources for local governments, and has around 15 % share of the total local government's revenue 21) . Hence, it is also important to analyze the effect of this type of subsidies regarding the decision problem on public infrastructure provision.
Suppose that the central government provides subsidies sI i to local governments and s(I 1 +I 2 ) ≤ τ 1 + τ 2 where s is the subsidy ratio.
The decision problem, (8) , is modified by as follows:
with first order necessary and sufficient condition:
Now I examine the extent to which the local public infrastructure is provided under decentralization with the central government's subsidy. To see this, I compare the size of the total investment with under the complete fiscal decentralization.
Let Ψ S i (I i ) denotes the left-hand side of the equation (33):
(34) Note that Ψ S i (X S i ) = 1 or Ψ D i (X D i ) = 1 give an optimal solution I * i given the opponent's strategy I j , and I always have Ψ S i (I i ) > Ψ D i (I i ) given the same opponent's strategy I j . Hence, an analogous analysis, as demonstrated in section 4.2, yields the following result:
Proposition 3 . Under decentralization with the central government's subsidy;
[I] if the two regions are homogeneous, that is, a 1 = a 2 , then both regions invests more in public infrastructure (I i ) than under complete fiscal decentralization regime.
[II] if the two regions are heterogeneous, that is, a 1 ̸ = a 2 , then at least one region or both regions invest more in public infrastructure than under complete fiscal decentralization regime.
Proof
The proof is completely analogous to that of Proposition 1.
[I] Homogeneous Case (i) I S * 1 < I D * 
. This condition cannot hold. The proof is the same as part (i) of the homogeneous case and thus, this condition cannot hold.
Under complete fiscal decentralization regime, Ψ D i (I i , I j ) − 1 is the marginal return to public investment and Ψ D i (I D * i , I D * j ) = 1 gives an investment equilibrium. Under partial fiscal decentralization with the central government's subsidy, however, Ψ D i (I S * i , I S * j ) = 1 − s gives an investment equilibrium. Intuitively, both local governments tend to invest in public infrastructure so that the marginal return to public investment is equalized to −s, which is definitely negative. This implies that at least one region or both regions tend to invest more in public infrastructure than under complete fiscal decentralization. In addition, as the value of s increases we have larger difference in investment equilibrium between under partial fiscal decentralization with the central government's subsidies and under complete fiscal decentralization.
If the two regions are heterogeneous, then we still have the following three possibilities: and I S * 2 > I D * 2 . Some readers might be interested in what variables determines the three conditions, (ii), (iii) and (iv), at an investment equilibrium. In order to discuss this issue, I perform comparative statics with respect to the parameters used in the model.
Totally differentiating equation (33), we have:
where ∆ = ∂Ψ S 1 (I 1 , and I S * 2 > I D * 2 . In addition, we also arrived at the following conclusion: under decentralization with the central government's subsidy if the two regions are homogeneous, that is, a 1 = a 2 , then both regions invests more in public infrastructure (I i ) than under complete fiscal centralization regime. If the two regions are heterogeneous, that is, a 1 ̸ = a 2 , then at least one region or both regions invest more in public infrastructure than under complete fiscal centralization regime. This follows by combining Proposition 1 and Proposition 3.
(2) Numerical simulation
In order to see how the model works, I conducted an analogous numerical simulation as already presented in Section 4.3. The premise conditions are given in the Table 2 .
One such diagram is illustrated in Fig.8 . The four bold solid lines indicate the best-response correspondence curves both under complete fiscal decentralization and under fiscal decentralization with the central government's subsidies: the green curves indicate ψ 1 (I 2 ) and the red curves indicates ψ 2 (I 1 ), respectively. Also, the inner curves indicates the best-response curves corresponding to complete fiscal decentralization, and the outer curves indicates the curves corresponding to decentralization with the central government's subsidies. This is because ψ S i (I i , I j ) > ψ D i (I i , I j ) always holds for the same I i and I j ;
is decreasing in I i ; and consequently ψ S i (I j ) must locate outside ψ D i (I j ). In the case illustrated in Fig.8 , the investment equilibrium is symmetric with each economy having an identical region-specific parameter, and providing identical size of public infrastructure, respectively. As a result of numerical analysis, public infrastructure provision of the two local governments under the complete decentralization regime, is totally different from both under complete fiscal centralization regime and under complete fiscal decentralization regime, as Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 suggest: Public investment under decentralization with the central's subsidies is more than both under complete centralization and both complete decentralization, if the two regions are identical.
The change in the region-specific parameter a i affects the investment equilibrium under decentralization with the central's subsidies. To see this, Fig.9 is constructed with a higher level of the region-specific parameter. All other parameters remain the same as Fig.8 .
Comparing the best-response correspondence curves in Fig.9 with the curves in Fig.8 . The best-response correspondence curve of the region-2 ψ 2 (I 1 ) shifts to the lower position while the curve ψ 1 (I 2 ) shifts to the right, as Lemma 1 suggests. As a result, the investment equilibrium given by the intersection of the two curves shifts to the lower right. In this case, we still have I S * i > I D * i > I C * i ∀i.
CONCLUSION
What I have shown in this paper is that a simple model with labor mobility across regions suggests that complete fiscal decentralization and partial fiscal decentralization are not necessarily the best in terms of economic efficiency in the sense at least one local government or both local governments invest more in public infrastructure than under complete fiscal centralization. Numerical simulation results suggest that careful parameterization of the economy is very important to determine whether decentralization leads to a "race to the bottom". In the context of public infrastructure management, a "race to the bottom" means that the competition of the two local governments would lead to undermine social welfare of regions and the whole country by overinvestment in public infrastructure, and may result in an investment equilibrium far away from the first best state. In context of globalized economy and international trade, Chau and Kanbur 22) showed that it is possible that South-South competition Table 2 Values of parameters and invest equilibrium.
Case a 1 a 2 I C * to export leads to a "race to the bottom" under certain circumstances. These imply that competition between governments is not necessarily allaround good thing and that the involvement of the central government is still needed throughout the entire process of decision making in public infrastructure provision.
There are obviously many ways in which the analysis could be extended. I would, however, emphasize four directions in particular.
First, the welfare of workers is in fact the same across the regions in my model since I did not take into account of the effects of public good P i since P i is canceled out in my model. In other words, if workers could "vote with their feets" and still enjoy perfect mobility as Tiebout 23) considered, the uneven income consequences of decentralization may be lessened. This implies that it is important to incorporate the diversified preferences on public good in future research. Second, the model excludes capital mobility: indeed, it has no capital. Not only the labor movement but also capital movement has a significant impact on regional economies. Thus, a natural step would be to add capital movement.
Finally, it is obviously important to discipline this analysis with some real numbers. Since the analysis indicates some different images of the general understanding of decentralization, it is crucial to do at least rough empirical work to explore the unbiased image of decentralization and check validity of the model.
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